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NON-DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF 
RACE IN SOUTH AFRICA-WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE PROMOTION OF 
EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR 
DISCRIMINATION ACT 
GRETE S. VOGT* 
INTRODUCTION 
In view of South Africa's past history, the need for legislation to prohibit 
unfair discrimination and to set new values was pressing. In the South African 
Constitution, equality is enunciated as a value and as a right.' As regards the 
individual's immediate claim not to be discriminated against on the ground of 
race, one needs to focus on the right. However, given the vast legacy that 
apartheid has left behind, more is needed, i.e. something that addresses the 
inherited inequalities and imbalances. The constitutional equality guarantee 
states in section 9 of the Constitution:2 
"(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed 
to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be 
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless 
it is established that the discrimination is fair." 
The section enunciates a general equality guarantee (subsection 1), defines it 
by outlawing unfair discrimination on a number of grounds (subsections 3 and 
4), expressly allows for affirmative action (subsection 2) and lays the burden of 
proof upon the discriminator (subsection 5, applying when the grounds listed in 
subsection 3 are present). Furthermore, in line with the constitutional obligation 
in subsection (4), on 4 February, 2000, Parliament enacted the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (henceforth, "the Equality 
Act").3 This legislation, which follows the constitutional provision and some 
* School of Law, University of Birmingham. The author is indebted to Professor Gordon 
Woodman for his helpful comments. 1 C. Albertyn and B. Goldblatt, "Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an IndigenousJurisprudence of Equality", (1998) 14(2) South African Joumal of Human 
Rights 249. 2 The so-called final constitution came into force on 4 February, 1997, replacing the interim 
constitution of 1994. 
3 In terms of Item 23(1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution this legislation had to be enacted within 
three years of the date on which the Constitution commenced. 
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constitutional court case law on non-discrimination, is meant to make the 
prohibition of discrimination even more effective. However, bearing in mind the 
inequalities that apartheid has left, a closer look at the concept of non- 
discrimination as well as the enforcement mechanisms in the Act reveals that 
there is little prospect of meeting these goals for the potential protection against 
racial discrimination has been limited. 
THE EQUALITY PROVISIONS 
Introduction 
Section 9 of the Constitution aims at the prevention of discrimination and 
the promotion of equality, and the Equality Act seeks to give effect to this. The 
drafters sought to produce a comprehensive document that would define the 
concept of equality and offer a means to analyse any form of discrimination. In 
line with this, the Equality Act codifies preceding case law of the Constitutional 
Court.4 How successful the Equality Act is in giving effect to the constitutional 
clause can be examined by focusing on the definition of the concept, the "test 
of discrimination" as it is described, and the way in which all this is drafted. 
The definition of equality 
There are two ways of defining the right to equality. There may be a positive 
interpretation through the concept of equality itself and there may be a negative 
interpretation through the concept of non-discrimination.5 Both definitions can 
be found in the Act. Equality is defined positively thus:6 
"(ix) 'equality' includes the full and equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms as 
contemplated in the Constitution and includes dejure and defacto equality and 
also equality of outcomes ..." 
Read with subsection (2) of the constitutional guarantee, the South African 
concept of equality thus endorses substantive equality, allowing for differential 
treatment as long as it promotes previously disadvantaged groups of people. It 
means the right to be treated as equals but not the right to receive equal 
treatment.7 This provides a possibility to tackle the inequalities that apartheid 
has left.8 Two policies aim at such a concept of equality: equality of result and 
equality of opportunity. With its definition of equality, the Act clearly aims at 
the former. However, several reasons lead one to believe that such a concept 
does not appear appropriate for the country's needs. 
During the debates on the Constitution there was an indication that South 
Africa had ruled out equality of result since it had opted for a market economy. 
4 Relevant Constitutional Court cases on equality are: President of he Republic ofSouth Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); Harksen v. Lane NO, 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC), 
1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC), 1998 (2) SA 363 
(CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 5 Even though the two concepts are often treated as if synonymous in international law. See A. 
Bayefsky, "The Principle of Non-discrimination in International Law", 11 HRLJ, 1. Really they 
should be distinguished in view of their differing scope. 
6 S. l(ix) Equality Act (EA). 7 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London, 1977, 226, 227. 8 For more detail, see the substantive proposals of the African National Congress, the National 
Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party at the constitution-making process in: H. Klug, "Analysen 
und Berichte-South Africa's New Constitution: the Challenges of Diversity and Identity", (1994) 
28 VeSfassung und Recht in Ubersee-Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 421, 424-434. 
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Indeed, the South African Law Commission and the African National Congress 
intended to include such an economic policy in the Bill of Rights, even though 
this is not the function of such a document.9 During the debates on the Equality 
Bill the importance of the economy was stressed again.?1 The choice of a market 
economy necessarily has an impact on the approach to racial equality. The 
economy, by its very nature, is driven by competition and thus cannot allow for 
an outcome where all would have the same standing. What the definition should 
have included instead is a policy of equality of opportunity that would allow all 
to stand on an equal footing when they set off for some goal or benefit." 
However, according to this definition, equal opportunity means the opportunity 
to compete for something and to earn it through productive effort. This definition 
may give the impression that it does not produce more overall equality as it 
creates a broader and stiffer competition. But that does not show that arguments 
for equality of outcome are justified. Equal opportunity means equal socially 
imposed obstacles. The (allegedly) inegalitarian effect which is created is the 
consequence of the deserved fruits gained by efforts of some-having competed 
under equal conditions. The situation is not in conflict with substantive equality 
since the interpretation of equal opportunity explicitly leaves room for individual 
development. This individual development does not need to be justified 
separately.'2 And it would be counter-productive to exclude this individuality by 
aiming at equality of outcome. 
The majority of philosophers agree that there is an obligation-although to 
varying degrees-on the responsibility of the state or society to create such a 
situation.13 And such understanding of the concept of equality has been developed 
at the international level as well. The UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination acknowledges that there is a positive aspect to the 
principle of equality and makes special practical measures mandatory on the 
parties.'4 This positive aspect aims at equality of opportunities and not at 
outcome.'5 On the other hand, the negative definition of equality employs the 
concept of non-discrimination. Accordingly, racial equality means the prohibition 
9 J. Dugard, "Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Post-Apartheid South Africa" in R.A. Licht 
and B. de Villiers (eds.), South Africas Crisis of Constitutional Democracy-Can the U.S. Constitution Help? 
Johannesburg, 1994, 130, 131. 10 See for instance the submission of Business South Africa (BSA) on the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Bill [B57-99]. l A.H. Goldman, "The Justification of Equal Opportunity" in E.F. Paul et al., Equal Opportunity, 
Oxford, 1987, 88. 
12 Goldman, above, uses the (indirect) justification of the possibility of desert which has to be 
achieved through fair procedures as a further justification besides equality. However, the inclusion 
of fair procedures as an additional condition is not really necessary because equal socially imposed 
obstacles already covers that point. If the procedures were not fair, then the socially imposed obstacles 
would not be equal. 13 Disapproving of such an assumption, see R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York, 1974, 
ch. 3: From his standpoint of natural justice he believes coercive governmental mechanisms aiming 
to achieve egalitarian goals are morally impermissible; by coercing people into contributing to the 
welfare of others, the government violates the rights of those who are coerced. See also J. Rawls, A 
Theo?y of Justice, London, 1994, ch. 2. 14 See, in particular, art. 2(2). 15 M.S. McDougal et al., Human Rights and the World Public Order, London, 1980, 458-459: The 
commitment is broader than one to mere non-discrimination. Equality is defined in positive terms 
as opportunities to discover, develop and exercise full capabilities for constructive participation in 
all value processes. 
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of unfair discrimination on the ground of race.16 The Equality Act prohibits 
discrimination generally in section 6: 
"Neither the State nor any person may unfairly discriminate against any person." 
Section 7 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race specifically: 
"Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on 
the ground of race, including- 
(a) the dissemination of any propaganda or idea, which propounds the racial 
superiority or inferiority of any person, including incitement to, or participation 
in, any form of racial violence; 
(b) the engagement in any activity which is intended to promote, or has the effect 
of promoting, exclusivity, based on race; 
(c) the exclusion of persons of a particular race group under any rule or practice 
that appears to be legitimate but which is actually aimed at maintaining 
exclusive control by a particular race group; 
(d) the provision or continued provision of inferior services to any racial group, 
compared to those of another racial group; 
(e) the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual 
opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps 
to reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons." 
In line with this, discrimination means:'7 
"... any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or 
situation which directly or indirectly- 
(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or 
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from any person on one or 
more of the prohibited grounds." 
Even if the definition of discrimination is comparable to the definition in 
international law, the content of the right still differs greatly from the provisions 
in (European and) international law, for it gives a wider scope to the right and 
imposes a different onus of proof. The definition may seem comparable to the 
one adopted in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination which defines discrimination as "... any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms ...'.18 However, apart from the similar definition, the South African 
guarantee goes further in that it applies horizontally."9 Furthermore, the South 
African definition includes the prohibition of indirect discrimination just like 
subsection (3) of the constitutional guarantee. 
The two-step test adopted 
In determining whether unfair discrimination on this ground has taken place 
the courts need to apply a two-stage enquiry. Firstly, they need to examine 
whether discrimination on the ground of race has taken place, and then, secondly, 
16 Ss. 6 and 7 EA. 
17 S. l(viii) EA. 18 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1(1) 
(the International Convention). 19 Article 2 para. l(d) and article 5(e) and (f) of the International Convention clearly refer to 
vertical application. 
200 Racial Discrimination in South Africa [2001] J.A.L. 
whether such treatment has been unfair.20 The first step of the examination is 
guided by the definition of discrimination in the Act.21 Whereas the first step 
will usually be straightforward it is the determination of "unfairness" in the 
second step, where the problems arise. 
Discrimination on the ground of race is, by section 9(5) of the Constitution 
deemed to be unfair unless the respondent rebuts this assumption.22 How this 
needs to be done is stated in section 14: 
"(1) It is not unfair discrimination to take measures designed to protect or advance 
persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the 
members of such groups or categories of persons. 
(2) In determining whether the respondent has proved that the discrimination is 
fair, the following must be taken into account: 
(a) The context; 
(b) The factors referred to in subsection (3); 
(c) Whether the discrimination reasonably andjustifiably differentiates between 
persons according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the 
activity concerned; 
(3) The factors referred to in subsection 2(b) include the following: 
(a) Whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity; 
(b) The impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant; 
(c) The position of the complainant in society and whether he or she suffers 
from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such 
patterns of disadvantage; 
(d) The nature and extent of the discrimination; 
(e) Whether the discrimination is systemic in nature; 
(f) Whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose; 
(g) Whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose; 
(h) Whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means to achieve 
the purpose; 
(i) Whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being 
reasonable in the circumstances to- 
(i) address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to one or more 
of the prohibited grounds; or 
(ii) accommodate diversity." 
The examination on this second step is inevitably wide-ranging. It is concerned 
with the impact on the complainant as well as factors that touch on reasonableness 
and justifiability. In prescribing such a procedure, the Act departs from the 
initial course set by the Constitution of curtailing the potential scope of the 
equality right. The following will analyse this problem more closely. 
The Constitutional Court has also developed a two-step test to determine 
unfair discrimination within section 9. It first examines whether discrimination 
has taken place and then whether such discrimination is unfair. Since 
discrimination on the ground of race is a specified ground in the Constitution 
as well, the presumption of unfairness has to be rebutted by the respondent 
20 This is the effect of s. 13(2)(a) EA. 21 S. l(1)(viii) EA. 22 According to the constitutional guarantee, discrimination on the grounds of race is deemed to 
be unfair since race is a specified ground; see s. 9(5) read with subsection (3) of the Constitution; 
The Equality Act aims at the same regulation, however not in such straightforward terms. Section 
13 states: 
"(2) If the discrimination did take place- 
(a) on a ground in paragraph (a) of the definition of 'prohibited grounds', then it is unfair, unless 
the respondent proves that the discrimination is fair;" 
Section l(l)(xxii)(a) then lists race as the first specified ground. 
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within the second step. However, according to the Constitution, the non- 
discrimination guarantee in section 9 is subject to limitations. Section 36 states: 
"(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of a law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including- 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and the purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose." 
Thus, if in a racial discrimination case that is examined within the constitutional 
equality guarantee it is found that unfair discrimination has taken place, the further 
question arises as to whether there is in these circumstances any justification for 
it under section 36. There should be a strict distinction between the analysis of 
unfairness and the examination of a justification within a limitation of the right. 
The justification of an infringement should take place in a separate, third step. 
Any other approach would make section 36 redundant for, if reasonableness 
and justifiability were meant to be tested as an element of unfairness, there 
would be no need for the separate provision in section 36. Nevertheless, already 
in the first equality cases the Constitutional Court has struggled with this 
distinction. It considered the intention of an act, public reaction and administrative 
inconvenience as relevant in the analysis of unfairness23 even though these factors 
would seem to relate to the question whether or not there is a positive reason 
for limiting the equality right. 
As in South Africa, the Canadian Charter guarantees non-discrimination24 
and stipulates limits to the right in terms of its justification. Section 1 states: 
"The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 
The Canadian Supreme Court has recognized the importance of keeping the 
two sections analytically distinct.25 
By combining reasonableness and justifiability within the rebuttal of unfairness, 
the Equality Act erases the distinction that the Constitution has made. That has 
several potentially devastating effects. The reversal of the burden of proof 
provision, which is the same as the constitutional clause, is weakened considerably 
by such a broad understanding of "unfairness". The effect is that the defendant 
can discharge the presumption of unfairness not only by showing that the 
discrimination was "fair" in a narrow sense, but simply by testifying that there 
was a legitimate purpose and that there was no less-restrictive means to reach 
23 President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (4) SA (CC) 1, 1997 (6) BCLR 708, at paras. 
40-48, 46, 106. 
24 S. 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: 
"Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental and physical ability." 25 Re Ontario Human Rights Commission etal. and Simpson-Sears Ltd (1986) 23 DLR (4th) 321 (SCC), 
at 329; Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews (1989) 56 DLR (4th) 1 at 21. 
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that purpose. In consequence the initial force of the guarantee of racial equality 
becomes practically worthless.26 
Furthermore, jurisprudentially there is a big difference between finding that 
an act does not infringe the equality guarantee, and finding that it does infringe 
the guarantee but that the limitation which it contains is justified. While the 
court order in both instances may be the same, the two legal routes have differing 
impacts on the scope of the equality right. A finding that an act does not infringe 
the racial equality guarantee reduces the scope of the right so that it excludes 
the class of cases exemplified by that particular act. However, a finding that the 
act infringes the racial equality guarantee but that the infringement is justified, 
means that the right usually prohibits such acts but that in the particular case 
the guarantee is set aside 'for the higher value of the common good. The latter 
route leaves more room for corrective policies, as well as measures for situations 
which may not be foreseeable at the moment. 
The Equality Act has therefore, through its approach to testing unfair 
discrimination, limited the scope of the equality right. The situation might have 
been slightly different if the Act applied only to relations between private persons 
because the Constitution allows a limitation only in terms of a law of general 
application. Indeed section 7 of the Act does not mention the State as a violator 
but rather discriminatory acts by one person against another person although 
the State is mentioned in the general discrimination prohibition in section 6. 
A drafting disaster 
To enable victims of racial discrimination to protect themselves against the 
violation of their rights, they need to be able to understand them. On the other 
hand, the content of the legislation must not be over-simplistic as that would 
lead to extensive legal challenges to clarify the legal situation. The Act as it 
stands, however, is neither simple nor clear. Once again, the under-educated 
majority, especially in the rural areas, is disadvantaged. 
The provisions of the Act also appear repetitive. This conclusion can be drawn 
regarding the prohibition of race discrimination as well as the determination of 
its unfairness. Section 6 proclaims the general prohibition of unfair discrimination 
stating that neither the State nor any person may unfairly discriminate against 
any person.27 Section 7 then prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race 
specifically listing some examples.28 Additionally, the definition of "prohibited 
grounds" lists race as the first specified ground.29 However, the drafters have 
torn up the single prohibition in section 9(3) of the Constitution and created 
three separate provisions which appear at three different locations. 
There is a similar situation regarding the determination of unfairness. What 
the Constitution deals with in one section30 appears in several separate sections 
26 This is what distinguishes the Equality Act from the Employment Equity Act as the latter does 
not feature such a reversed onus of proof. Indeed, the approach adopted there-examining 
reasonableness and justifiability within unfairness-also limits the scope of equality. However, the 
Employment Equity Act does not contradict itself in the way the Equality Act does, by first granting 
wider protection (by reversing the burden of proof) and then taking such wider protection away in 
the same test. 
27 S. 6 EA. 
28 S. 7 EA. 
29 S. l(l)(xxii)(a) EA. 
30 S. 9(3) and (5) Constitution of South Africa. 
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of the Act. Thus section 7 prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds of 
race whilst section 13(2)(a) read together with section l(l)(xxii)(a) states that if 
discrimination takes place on the specified ground of race it is presumed to be 
unfair. According to section 13(2)(a), in the same manner as the constitutional 
provision, the respondent has to rebut the presumption. In line with this, section 
14 then lists what has to be taken into account when determining unfairness.31 
This section was presumably intended to make it easier to reach decisions as to 
whether the burden of proof had been discharged by codifying the factors. 
However, it appears more confusing than the test as previously applied by the 
Constitutional Court. 
Section 14(2) determines that the context, and the factors listed in subsection 
(3)(a), as well as objectively determinable criteria intrinsic to the activity need to 
be taken into account. It may be commented, firstly, that listing the factors 
referred to in section 14(2)(b) separately in section 14(3) does not assist one's 
understanding. Secondly, the factors listed in section 14(3) are "objectively 
determinable criteria" according to which it is determined "whether the 
discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons". Section 
14(2)(c), which uses these words, is thus repetitive. Thirdly, section 14(1) expressly 
allows for affirmative action. However, this subsection again seems unnecessary 
and repetitive given that the factors for determining fairness listed in section 
14(2) and (3) will preclude the affirmative action referred to from being held 
unfair. It may be that the drafters tried to make the enforcement of affirmative 
action policies easier by discouraging extensive analysis through the courts. 
However, this way limits scrutiny by the courts. Further, while international law 
imposes a limit on positive measures by providing that they must terminate as 
soon as the inequality is remedied,32 the South African provision has no similar 
limit.33 
Section 7 lists some examples of unfair discrimination on the grounds of race.34 
As regards these five forms of discrimination it does not appear possible to prove 
fairness in line with section 13(2)(a). Whatever the context35 or the factors 
determining the impact on the complainant,36 there is no possible argument to 
rebut the presumption of unfairness for propounding racial superiority or 
inferiority and racial violence,37 for racial exclusivity, direct38 or indirect,39 or for 
the denial of opportunities on the grounds of race.40 The provision of inferior 
31 S. 14(1)-(3) EA. 32 Article 1(2) of the International Convention states: 
"Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial 
or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure 
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a 
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they 
shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved." 33 Clearly, such limit may be implied in the South African provision. 3 S. 7(a)-(e) EA. 
35 S. 13(2)(a) EA. 36 S. 13(2)(b) read together with s. 13(3) EA. 37 S. 7(a) EA. 38 S. 7(b) EA. 
39 S. 7(c) EA. 40 S. 7(d) EA. 
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services, however, is unavoidable until the municipalities succeed in bringing the 
services up to date.41 Thus it does not seem appropriate to list such examples. 
Conclusion 
With the Equality Act there is a danger of developing contradictory and 
confusing jurisprudence. Even though it is intended to give effect to the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution in its aim to provide for measures to facilitate the 
eradication of unfair discrimination,42 several aspects are counter-productive. 
Thus the meaning and scope of equality is not sufficiently clear and to aim at 
equality of outcome conflicts with the Constitution as well as the principles of a 
market economy. The procedure through which an infringement of racial equality 
is to be established narrows the scope of the equality guarantee and is confusing. 
Further the provisions prohibiting racial discrimination are confusing and 
repetitive. 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
Introduction 
The formal guarantee itself does not make racial equality work. This is 
illustrated by the United States' poor history of genuine racial equality in the 
early period of the constitutional equality guarantee.43 What is also needed is an 
institutional framework that is committed to the concept of racial equality. In 
the South African context, non-discrimination on the ground of race is meant 
to be implemented by so-called Equality Courts, supported by the South African 
Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality, and the 
Equality Review Committee. In line with this, section 16 states: 
"(1) For the purposes of this Act, but subject to section 31 - 
(a) every magistrate's court and every High Court is an equality court for the 
area of its jurisdiction; and 
(b) any magistrate, additional magistrate and judge may be designated by the 
Minister, after consultation with the Judge President or the head of an 
administrative region defined in section 1 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 
1944 (Act No. 32 of 1944), concerned, as the case may be, as a presiding 
officer of the equality court of the area in respect of which he or she is 
magistrate, additional magistrate or judge, as the case may be. 
(2) A presiding officer must perform the functions and exercise the powers assigned 
to or conferred on him or her under this Act or any other law." 
Equality Courts, before which proceedings are instituted in terms of or under 
the Equality Act, hold inquiries, determine whether unfair discrimination has 
41 See the cases regarding municipal service: City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, op cit. or at the 
Supreme Court: Kempton Park/Tembisa Metropolitan Substructure v. Kelder, 51/98 (Unreported, 31 March, 
2000). 
42 S. 2 EA. 
43 The influence of the American Supreme Court, as one institution, on the enforcement, or non- 
enforcement of this guarantee, is illustrated by the possibility of institutionalizing racial inequality 
through a doctrine of "separate but equal" which the Court authorized for more than 80 years 
despite a general equality guarantee. See K.L. Hall et al., American Legal History-Cases and Materials, 
2nd ed., Oxford, 1996, 510-516; B. Derrick, Race, Racism and American Law, 3rd ed., London, 1992, 
43. In the South African context this has been pointed out by C. O'Regan, "The Enforcement and 
Protection of Human Rights: The Role of the Constitutional Court in South Africa" in B. Ajibola 
and D. van Zyl, The Judiciary in Africa, Cape Town, 1998, 1-16. 
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taken place, and make an appropriate order in the circumstances.44 The South 
African Human Rights Commission (the Commission) and other relevant 
institutions may assist complainants in instituting proceedings and conduct 
investigations.45 Furthermore, the Commission and the Commission on Gender 
Equality supervise the implementation of so-called equality plans.46 The Equality 
Review Committee (ERC) was established immediately upon promulgation of 
the Equality Act and advises about its operation.47 
The relevant institutions thus consist of old and new elements, the courts 
being the inherited element with the Commission as well as the ERC being the 
newcomers. This marriage of old and new will be able to enforce racial equality 
only if the framework and the powers suit the country's specific needs. The 
formal structure of the enforcement mechanisms, the enforcement powers, and 
the public access to it must be examined. 
Institutions 
Enforcing the Act through magistrates' and high courts is practical and 
efficient. The court structure is available and the high number of courts ensure 
easy accessibility. Additionally, the court buildings are being refurbished and 
additional buildings are being built in rural areas.48 Given the ongoing financial 
constraints,49 the establishment of separate equality tribunals, which had also been 
a debated option,50 appears impractical as they would require the establishment of 
new structures besides the existing "normal" courts. 
Even so, the use of the courts generates its own problems, not least the 
shortage of adequately trained staff5' and work load.52 Also, ideologically, the 
majority of the population does not have confidence in the inherited judiciary.53 
Part of the reason for this is that the personnel structure of the courts remains 
largely the same and as a consequence of the apartheid policy a shortage of 
non-white candidates leaves the courts unrepresentative of the population's 
44 S. 21(1) and (2) EA. 
45 S. 25(3) EA. 46 S. 25(4), (5) EA. 
47 S. 33(l)(a)-(c) EA. 48 Statement by Dr M.P. Maduna, MP, Minister ofJustice and Constitutional Development, on 
the Efficiency of the Courts, made in Parliament on 9 September, 1999. 
49 That resources are limited had been recognized in S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 
1995 (2) SACR 1; 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). See also Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu- 
Natal), 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
50 See the public submissions on the Promotion of the Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Bill (B57-99) in line with the hearings by the ad hoc Joint Committee of Parliament 
in November 1999, especially the submission of the Commission on Gender Equality. 
51 As a result of high living costs and safety aspects officials are not interested in working in 
Johannesburg Magistrates' Court; Maduna, above. 
52 There are huge backlogs, particularly in the Western Cape and Eastern Cape, see Budget 
Speech: Department ofJustice and Constitutional Development, delivered by Dr Maduna, Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development, 6 June, 2000, "Meeting the Challenges of the 21st 
Century". 53 This became clear during the debate regarding the reform of the judiciary after the collapse 
of apartheid. There was no differentiation between the institution as a purely technical entity and 
its personnel. Because of its record under apartheid, many have suggested a completely new institution 
because judicial review cannot be handed over to the inherited judiciary; see, for instanceJ. Dugard, 
above, at 141. See also C. Forsyth, "Interpeting a Bill of Rights: The Future Tasks of a Reformed 
Judiciary?" (1991) 7 SAJHR, 5; J. Hlophe, "The Role of the Judges in a Transformed South 
Africa-Problems, Challenges and Prospects" (1995) 112 SALJ, 24. 
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composition,54 especially regarding higher positions. By October 1998-four 
years after the collapse of apartheid-as few as two black judges had been 
recruited to leading positions: one as Judge President and another as Deputy 
Judge President of provincial divisions.55 However, the cultural attitude of the 
judge does have an impact on the outcome of the decision.56 The lack of 
representation of the majority of the population as well as the insufficiency of 
training in human rights questions results in a danger of biased judgment. This 
has been experienced by other legal systems as well.57 
In the South African context this poses an obstacle particularly in racial 
equality cases. The reason for this lies in the legacy of apartheid. The nature of 
Equality Courts is such that these judges have to define what are the underlying 
values of racial equality and judge what is best for the community.58 Furthermore, 
the equality jurisdiction requires the comparison of similar situations.59 However, 
because of the composition of the Equality Courts, instead of a neutral standard 
as a basis for testing racial equality, "whiteness" will be implicit in the norm.60 
Hand in hand with this goes a degree of complacency of lawyers about the 
profession's devotion to justice and its aptitude for meeting social needs, when 
clearly these characteristics in reality are present only to a limited degree.6' 
Before the introduction of Equality Courts this potential for bias or prejudice 
had been less acute. Regarding the constitutional equality guarantee, magistrates' 
courts had limited powers whilst the Constitutional Court had exclusive power 
to declare an Act of Parliament null and void. Orders regarding the validity of 
legislation made by the lower courts were submitted to it for confirmation.62 In line 
with this, it was considered desirable-and in the interest of racial equality-that 
magistrates' courts were excluded from pronouncing on the validity of legislation.63 
Thus whenever any issue concerning racial equality was raised in a case, the 
court would either have to assume the validity of the act or conduct in question, 
or it would have had to refer the dispute to a higher court.64 With the promulgation 
of the Equality Act the magistrates' courts have taken on greater responsibility 
54 In 2000 there were 51 black judges and 141 white judges in the high courts, and 719 black 
magistrates and 1,013 white magistrates: information furnished by the Department of Justice, 11 
August, 2000. 5 Judge Bernard Ngoepe had been appointedJudge President of the Transvaal Provincial Division 
and Judge Vuka Tshabalala as Judge Deputy President of the KwaZulu-Natal Division. 56 See, for example, Forsyth, above; J. Sarkin, "The Political Role of the South African Con- 
stitutional Court", (1997) 11(1) SALJ, 137. 57 Even in other legal systems the appearance of non-bias is a relative virtue, see G. Henry, 
"Pinochet: In Search of the Perfect Judge" (1999) 21 Sydney Law Review, 668. On issues of gender 
see B. Gaze, "Some Aspects of Equality Rights: Theory and Practice", in B. Galligan and C. 
Sampford, Rethinking Human Rights, Sydney, 1997, 189-209. 
58 Hlophe, above, states that "Judges are the upper guardians of such values and cultures", at 
29. 
59 The underlying rule for equality cases here will be the same as in foreign and international 
cases: to treat like alike and unlike cases according to their differences. 
60 Similar developments could be observed during the debate on reparations for past racism that 
took place in the United States: see D. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law, 3rd ed., London, 1992, 
53. 
61 E. Cameron, "Judicial Accountability in South Africa" (1990) 6 SAJHR 1990, 256; Cameron 
criticizes the complacency of lawyers in the context of an actual lack of independence from those 
who control the market or the state. His thesis can be used with equal force in the context of the 
question of neutrality. 62 Constitutional Complementary Act, Act 13 of 1995. 63 S. 170 EA. Section 110(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act, as amended by Act 80 of 1997, 
prevents magistrates' courts from pronouncing on the validity of any law. 
64 These were the options that the interim constitution proclaimed; for the assumption of validity, 
see also s. 110(2)(b) of the Magistrates' Courts Act, as amended in 1997. 
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and it is not clear whether they are ready for that. From the wording of section 
3165 it appears that the drafters of the Act have noted this problem: 
"(2) For the purposes of giving full effect to this Act and making the Act as 
accessible as possible- 
(a) and in giving effect to subsection (1), the Minister may designate suitable 
magistrates, additional magistrates or judges, as the case may be, and clerks 
referred to in subsection (1) as presiding officers and clerks, respectively, for 
one or more equality courts; 
(b) ... 
(4) The Minister must, after consultation with the Magistrates Commission and 
the Judicial Service Commission, issue policy directives and develop training 
courses with a view to- 
(a) establishing uniform norms, standards and procedures to be observed by 
presiding officers and clerks in the performance of their functions and 
duties and in the exercise of their powers; and 
(b) building a dedicated and experienced pool of trained and specialised 
presiding officers and clerks." 
The drafting and issuing of policy directives as well as the building of a pool of 
trained and specialized staff will take time. Furthermore, the making of the 
appointment of equality judges as the responsibility of the Minister for Justice 
and Constitutional Development66 jeopardizes the independence of the judiciary. 
It grants the executive excessive power, especially when the Judicial Service 
Commission and the Magistrates' Commission have been set up for exactly that 
purpose. The Judicial Service Commission, whose members are drawn largely 
from the legal profession and the legislature, makes recommendations to the 
President for appointments to the higher courts.67 The Magistrates' Commission 
makes appointments to the magistrates' courts.68 Given that the Equality Courts 
are basically the same courts, except that they adjudicate on a specific matter, 
it does not appear justified to withdraw the responsibility in this area from the 
Commissions. 
Outside the normal court process, the South African Human Rights 
Commission has an important contribution to make in the enforcement of the 
Act. It is much more representative than the courts and, as an institution created 
after apartheid, enjoys considerably more trust than the judiciary. A further 
institution of importance is the Equality Review Committee. This committee 
may be seen as important for the interim period during which the equality courts 
are being established. Since it will be these committees that will be presented 
with the large bulk of discrimination cases before they go to the courts, confidence 
in them is important. 
Powers 
For the Equality Act to be effective, these institutions need to enjoy sufficient 
powers. Before the Equality Act came into force, the oversight role of the 
Constitutional Court was crucial. However, the sole reliance on the Constitutional 
65 S.31 EA. 
66 
"Minister" means the Minister forJustice and Constitutional Development, s. l(l)(xvi) EA. 67 The composition is laid down in s. 178 of the Constitution. Of the 23 members 10 are from 
the legislative, 8 from the legal profession, 1 from the executive (Minister of Justice) and 4 are 
designated by the President (of which 3 must be advocates). 68 The Magistrates' Act, Act 90 of 1993 establishes the Magistrates' Commission which regulates 
the appointment and removal of magistrates. 
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Court for the effective implementation of racial equality was not a practical 
solution in the long run as it would have tended to reduce the importance of 
the other courts.69 With the introduction of Equality Courts, a slightly different 
approach was adopted. These courts can make orders that have the effect of 
orders of the same courts, sitting as magistrates' and high courts, in civil actions. 
The list of possible orders is long and includes interim orders, declaratory orders, 
orders for the implementation of special measures to address particular instances 
before the courts of unfair discrimination, hate speech or harassment, and even 
orders to make unconditional apologies. However, where the magistrates' courts, 
sitting as Equality Courts, enjoy more powers than before the Act,70 an order 
must be submitted to a judge of the High Court for confirmation.71 Thus, even 
though more powers have been granted there is still some form of control over 
the use of the wider power. 
Under the Constitution, magistrates were excluded from applying the equality 
guarantee directly because their jurisdiction in discrimination cases had been 
restricted to applying the values of equality and making any necessary 
interpretation arising therefrom.72 Since positive action cannot be interpreted so 
as to comply with the equality clause (being definable only as a justified departure 
from equality of treatment), these courts had no means to combat private 
discrimination which could always be claimed to be justifiable positive action. 
Whereas it was commendable to require magistrates to override all acts of private 
discrimination without regard to their alleged justification, it is not quite clear 
whether the courts are ready to take on the responsibility of distinguishing 
between justified and unjustified discrimination. Given that in South Africa 
private discrimination poses the central problem, some form of control through 
a higher court is therefore sensible. 
This control, however, can be sufficient only if the High Court sitting as an 
Equality Court is staffed by a pool of trained and specialized staff that is dedicated 
to the purpose of the Equality Act. The reservations mentioned concerning the 
magistrates' courts also apply to the high courts. These courts have been inherited 
from the previous order as well. And even though there has been some remarkable 
progress in their transformation, training in human rights issues will still be 
needed to maximize the potential of the racial equality provisions. 
In practice, many discrimination cases will be dealt with by the supporting 
institutions. The South African Human Rights Commission and the Commission 
for Gender Equality are specifically mentioned in the Act and they have 
been given specific responsibilities. These include investigatory powers73 and a 
69 N. Haysom, "Bill of Fundamental Rights", De Rebus 1994, 126 warned against judicial apartheid 
through the possible consequence of first and second class courts. 
70 Magistrates' Courts Act, Act 32 of 1944, Supreme Courts Act, Act 59 of 1959 and the Rules 
Board for Courts of Law Act, Act 107 of 1985. 
71 S. 19(3)(a) EA. Regulations need to be made by the Minister, see s. 30(1)(a). 
72 Magistrates' Courts may neither enquire into nor rule on the validity of any law, see s. 170 of 
the Constitution. Furthermore section 110 of the Magistrates' Courts Second Amendment Act, Act 
80 of 1997 states that a magistrates' court shall not be competent to pronounce on the validity of 
any law or conduct of the President. 73 S. 25(2) and (3) EA. 
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supervisory position over the implementation of so-called equality plans.74 The 
Equality Review Committee comprises seven members, including the 
chairpersons of the South African Human Rights Commission and of the 
Commission on Gender Equality.75 Thus, it is likely that the supporting 
commissions will deal with most complaints. 
Conclusion 
The Equality Act is backed up by a remarkable institutional framework with 
equality courts being distributed all over the country and enjoying wide powers. 
The Act is also supported by the South African Human Rights Commission and 
the Equality Review Committee. Two challenges that equality courts face are 
the need to enjoy adequate staffing and the need to develop public confidence 
in their ability to deal with the issues effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
Whilst the Equality Act is designed to give effect to the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution, its potential for achieving racial equality has been limited 
considerably by the unsatisfactory nature of parts of the legislation itself. It is a 
very ambitious undertaking to seek to define complex concepts like equality and 
non-discrimination and the attempt has, in fact, narrowed the scope of the 
equality right and created confusion. In this respect, the Equality Act does not 
fulfil the country's specific needs, i.e. an equality right that has a wide scope and 
allows for measures to redress the existing inequalities. Furthermore, it needs a 
right to non-discrimination that is understood by the people to whom it applies. 
As it is at the moment, the country has not yet provided the adequate training, 
either for those who are meant to benefit from the legislation or for those who 
are meant to give effect to the provisions. Finally, those sitting in the Equality 
Courts need to be demonstrably independent and selected in an open and 
representative process. Hopefully the Equality Review Committee will prove 
effective in its role of advising on the operation of the Act. 
74 Such equality plans need to be formulated with the Minister of Finance and include measures 
that aim to achieve equality in the ministers' areas of responsibility. These plans must be submitted 
to the South African Human Rights Commission within two years after the commencement of the 
Equality Act. The South African Human Rights Commission must then consult with the Commission 
on Gender Equality when dealing with these plans; see s. 25(4)(b) and (5)(a) and (b) EA. 
75 S. 32 EA. 
